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Afghanistan’s geostrategic position has al-
ways been important for the country and the ma-
jority of events in the country have been directly 
connected to its geographic position. Situated 
in an area where decades have followed with 
undisturbed calm and with unexpected erup-
tions of tectonic force, Afghanistan has within a 
short period of time repeatedly become the key 
battlefield of the contemporary world. The first 
instance was the event of the Soviet-Afghan 
War and the second time the present “global war 
on terror”. Both of these cases have in common 
the specific feature which shows that complex 
challenges generated in Afghanistan prior to the 
interventions and later in their course have pre-
sented a threat to the future of the country, as 
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The USSR intervention in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 and the current Allied 
US-led intervention in the same country have many different characteristics but 
also a lot of common features. The causes and the final goals for setting them in 
motion differ as much as their initial approaches but with the passage of time they 
have both grown into counterinsurgency operations. Both of them have gone into 
their tenth year, although the respective political elites have expected a quick and 
short intervention. Equally so, although militarily superior, the intervening forces 
have soon become operationally inferior, so that due to misunderstanding the 
environment, insufficient coordination and weak interior allies, with inadequate 
political framework, insufficient engagement of resources and inaccessible 
ground, all in all, finally limited to maintaining status quo. The political part has 
failed in the first place. The withdrawal has had devastating consequences for 
the Soviets. The present American withdrawal is a two-edged sword because the 
majority of tasks have not been fulfilled and there can be no doubt as to whether 
the long term deployment is not the right solution. It is important to analyze and 
compare the two operations in order to be able to detect the successful steps as 
well as the opportunities missed and draw conclusions on the continuation of the 
allied operation; for the Allies, as stated correctly by the historian Paul Robinson, 
have found themselves in a position quite similar to the Soviet case. The 
purpose of the research is twofold. First, to analyze the essential characteristics 
of the political dimension of counterinsurgency operation through the activity of 
the intervening force towards counterinsurgency operation centers of gravity; 
the second is to offer recommendations for the correct use of the principles of 
counterinsurgency operation.
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well as a threat to global security. The mentioned 
wars differ considerably in their initial goals; the 
results achieved, their legitimacy and the relation 
to people and space, though with a considerable 
number of common features. In both cases the 
intervening forces have tried to establish and 
develop a model of counterinsurgency operation 
as a pivotal element of overall policies aimed at 
inflicting a defeating blow upon the enemy. It is 
of additional interest to note that due to the short 
time span between the Soviet and the Ameri-
can intervention – the terrain has remained un-
changed, as well as the level of the insurgent 
technological resources – so that both forces 
fought a similar enemy and in some cases even 
the same one. To this statement we must add 
a remark that the sides in conflict today know 
one another much better because the Americans 
have been training and financing some of them 
during their counter -Soviet struggle. 
 For the Soviet Union (the previous Rus-
sian and the following experiences included) 
Afghanistan has been and has remained the 
most difficult experience of a counterinsurgency 
conflict which has entangled it in an exhaust-
ing and long-lasting conflict. After numerous Af-
ghan government requests for assistance in their 
fight against the Islamic insurgents, in Decem-
ber 1979, the Soviet Union Politburo passed 
a resolution on the intervention in Afghanistan 
(Lyakhovski, 2009). They have instantly put into 
power their follower Babrak Karmal, have at-
tempted to stop faction struggles within the rul-
ing party and have attempted to stabilize the 
state institutions in order to make them capable 
of defeating the insurgents. In their view, the du-
ration of the intervention was projected at sev-
eral months but eventually the Soviets stayed 
there for almost ten years. Since domestic se-
curity forces have proved incapable of prevent-
ing the spread of counter-government rebellion 
throughout the country, the Soviet Army and the 
Afghan army opened up operations against the 
insurgents. Initially, they were successful fight-
ing the insurgents, but the insurgent unification 
and with the help of foreign aid (US, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran) the insurgents (mujahedin) 
grew stronger and began achieving notewor-
thy operational goals. In the course of opera-
tions the Soviet Union came to realize that the 
amassing of great military formations was not 
efficient against small guerilla groups so that it 
consequently changed tactics and reorganized 
their forces in order to make them more efficient 
(Bogdanov, 2005). In May 1986 Babrak Karmal 
was dismissed for a number of failures and Mu-
hammad Najibullah, the then head of Afghan in-
telligence service KHAD (Khadamat-e Etela’at-e 
Dawlati), replaced him. Najibullah took the course 
towards national reconciliation, as well as negoti-
ating with the insurgents. The previous reforms 
drive got more lenient, a multi-party system was 
introduced and the overall level of state repres-
sion within the state was reduced. A new constitu-
tion was passed in November 1987 and the coun-
try’s name was changed again from Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan to Republic of Afghani-
stan. In April 1988 multi-party elections were held 
only to be qualified as fraudulent and boycotted 
by the mujahedin, with the consequence of the 
reopening of conflicts (Tabak, 2001). The Sovi-
ets withdrew completely on 15 February 1989, 
although they have continued the financial and 
technical support of the Kabul regime for several 
years to come. In general, the Soviets have un-
derestimated the situation and the opponent and 
have moved into Afghanistan without any kind 
of counterinsurgency doctrine which then had to 
be developed in the field, in an ad hoc manner 
(McMichael, 1989; Robinson, 2010). However, 
they have not been successful. The reason for 
this lied in the fact that their major lever of op-
eration was the military apparatus employed in 
a conventional manner which came from their 
preoccupation with Europe and the European 
manner of warfare so that the previous counter-
insurgency experiences have never become es-
sential components of their military institutional 
memory (McMichael, 1989; Cassidy, 2006).
Not long after the Soviets experienced “their 
own Vietnam” in Afghanistan, the US also under-
took a military intervention in Afghanistan. After 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US formed and 
lead an antiterrorist coalition in Operation Endur-
ing Freedom which had a fundamental counter-
terrorist orientation. The coalition quickly man-
aged to achieve its primary goals: the deposition 
of the Taliban, the destruction of the Al-Qaeda 
structure in Afghanistan and its banishment from 
the country. Al-Qaeda has been prevented from 
conducting global terrorist attacks. The greatest 
success of the operation has been the liquida-
tion of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan on 2 May 
2011. Almost simultaneously with the conduct of 
the antiterrorist operation, the US and the Allies 
developed a political framework for Afghanistan. 
This has been made possible through the re-
sults of the Bonn Conference (December 2001) 
where the decision on the establishment of a 
provisional Afghan administration under the lead-
ership of Hamid Karzai, as well as the employ-
ment of international forces under UN mandate 
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was passed – the establishment of the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. 
NATO took over an active part in the field opera-
tion in August 2003 by assuming the ISAF mis-
sion command which caused a mandate change 
in accordance with the UN Charter Chapter VII 
which provides for the use of force in support 
of peace. From this point on, Afghanistan has 
in many NATO leaders statements become the 
Alliance’s strategic priority and its major goal. 
We need not put any special emphasis on the 
fact that the US has the main say and the lead-
ing role in both the operations. It is however 
paradoxical that with the passage of time no de-
escalation and stabilization in the country has 
taken place and that the situation has become 
ever more complex and lethal. For this reason 
the US have changed their strategy several 
times although progress has always been doubt-
ful. In 2009, when it became apparent that the 
defeat of the insurgents is not in prospect, the 
turn in the approach has come about, mostly as 
a consequence of the new administration in the 
White House. The essential difference between 
President Barack Obama and former President 
George W. Bush is in the approach to Afghani-
stan, as well as to Pakistan. President Obama 
has placed Afghanistan and Pakistan into the 
very center of his foreign policy, while confirm-
ing the concept of one battlefield, encompassing 
both countries. The new strategy for Afghanistan 
is based on two key elements: on the change in 
the war-fighting culture with increased attention 
to population protection, on the relations with the 
population and on the transformation of the Al-
lied forces into a more trained and efficient force. 
Special emphasis has been put on Pakistan be-
cause the Afghan challenge could clearly not be 
resolved without its cooperation. The arrival of 
General Stanley McChrystal, an experienced 
practitioner of counterinsurgency operations as 
commander-in-chief of all American and NATO 
forces has marked a beginning of a period of ap-
plication of a modern military counterinsurgency 
operation model in the Afghan area of responsibil-
ity. However, the final results still cannot be pre-
dicted. Part of the reason for the US wandering 
is in the statement brought forward by Steven 
Metz, that the US security community has kept 
neglecting counterinsurgency operations from 
the end of the Cold War all the way to 2001. The 
subject has been taken out of military educa-
tion curricula due to the general loss of interest 
in developing new plans and capabilities (Metz, 
2007). For this reason the US have gone into Af-
ghanistan in very much the same manner, with-
out an appropriate military counterinsurgency 
approach which then had to be developed in the 
course of operation.
2. The Basic Counterinsurgency 
Operation Model
Counterinsurgency operations which proved 
successful in a specific area and time need not 
be equally efficient in another space and time. 
This fact is therefore to be kept in mind when-
ever one attempts to study any counterinsur-
gency operation. The lessons of the previous op-
erations are therefore of exceptional value and 
most importantly, save lives. It is also important 
to note the essential difference of the former and 
the present operations. The primary difference 
lies in the fact that the former operations have 
predominantly been conducted for the sake of 
colonial and/or imperial power and against self-
determination or a separatist movement. Such 
operations have, taking into account all other par-
ticipants, been distinctly military in orientation. Re-
gardless of the fact that military commanders con-
ducting them have always been displeased with 
the numbers of units assigned. The essence of 
the issue has been however that other social in-
struments have not been sufficiently developed 
or have not existed at all or have not been used 
in an appropriate manner. Present-day theoreti-
cians and practitioners (Eliot Cohen, John Nagl, 
David Kilcullen, David Bayley, Robert Perito) 
consider an approach employing dominantly mili-
tary factor as old-fashioned and therefore call it 
traditional. Present-day challenges require much 
more synergy and effort. More then ever, a view 
that the military constitute a highly essential 
tool is prevalent, though just one of several, so 
that victory or defeat can be achieved through 
an all-inclusive approach where a political role 
is the most important one. Such operations are 
therefore called modern counterinsurgency op-
erations and happen to be syntheses of politi-
cal, economic, military, police, intelligence, psy-
chological and civil actions (Cohen et al., 2006; 
Kilcullen, 2010; Bayley and Perito, 2010). Since 
political action constitutes the most critical part 
of counterinsurgency because it defines other 
components further, it should be given the great-
est possible attention. As an example of a mod-
ern counterinsurgency definition we highlight the 
following: 
“Those military, paramilitary, political, econom-
ic, psychological and civic actions taken to 
defeat insurgency” (NATO, 2008: 2-C-18); 
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“Comprehensive civilian and military efforts 
taken to defeat an insurgency and to address 
any core grievances” (US The Department of 
Defense Dictionary, 2010: 79); “Those military, 
law enforcement, political, economic, psycho-
logical and civic actions taken to defeat in-
surgency, while addressing the root causes” 
(UK British Army Field Manual Counter Insur-
gency, 2009: 1-6).
Modern counterinsurgency operations comprise 
principles, imperatives and paradoxes (Counterin-
surgency, 2006; Cohen et al., 2006). The elements 
of the quoted categories are in a complex rela-
tionship and in certain situations they act so as to 
be complementing one another, though they are 
equally capable of becoming obstacles in another 
situation. For example, the case of the tactical level 
decisions often made during counterinsurgency 
operations which are essential for strategic devel-
opment of events would stand as an operational 
imbalance in relation to classical conventional op-
erations. These principles represent the outlines of 
a counterinsurgency operation while imperatives 
and paradoxes complement the picture of the situ-
ation. The principles are to be explained in the fol-
lowing text. Imperatives are a group of measures 
and actions which are guiding for the intervening 
forces and which are reflected in the following val-
ues: information and expectation management, 
use of proportionate force, learning and adapta-
tion, strengthening of the field position of final 
executors, support to the government and the 
people in the country of intervention (Counterin-
surgency, 2006; Cohen et al., 2006). Paradoxes 
are, as the term states, controversies to a gener-
ally accepted statement, position or conclusion. 
In the case of counterinsurgency operations, 
controversies are reflected in the fact that ac-
tions and deeds which are justified and logical in 
conventional operations sometimes (even quite 
frequently) turn counterproductive, or even dam-
aging. The basic paradox of a counterinsurgency 
operation lays in the fact that victory, even if the 
intervening forces respect all the principles and 
imperatives and makes the right moves, is in no 
way guaranteed. This is namely what makes the 
counterinsurgency operations different from all 
other interventions. Quite a number of authors 
agree upon a list of most significant paradoxes 
of modern counterinsurgency operations:
• Sometimes, the more you protect your 
forces the less secure they come to be.
• Sometimes, the greater degree of force 
you apply, the lesser effectiveness you 
achieve. 
• The more successful the operation the few-
er force are to be engaged and greater 
the risk to be accepted. 
• Sometimes, the best reaction is to have 
no reaction. 
• One of the strongest weapons of coun-
terinsurgency forces is not to apply fire. 
• Sometimes, it is better when the domestic 
administration conducts a specific activity 
tolerably well than when the intervening 
forces perform the same task much bet-
ter. 
• If tactics work this week it may not func-
tion the next week; if tactics work in one 
province they need not work in another.
• The success at the tactical level does not 
guarantee anything. 
• Many important decisions are not made 
by generals (Counterinsurgency, 2006; 
Cohen et al., 2006; Bayley and Perito, 
2010).
David J. Kilcullen is right in stating that: 
“Insurgencies, like cancers, exist in thou-
sands of forms, and there are dozens of 
techniques to treat them, hundreds of dif-
ferent populations in which they occur, 
and several major schools of thought on 
how best to deal with them. The idea that 
there is one single ‘silver bullet’ panacea 
for insurgency is therefore as unrealistic 
as the idea of a universal cure for cancer” 
(Kilcullen, 2010: 1).
The author then goes on to state that “there 
are no standard templates or universal solution 
in counterinsurgency” (Kilcullen, 2010: 26). He 
also holds, what a group of experienced practi-
tioners and theoreticians formulate, that “while 
every insurgency is different because of distinct 
environments, root causes, and cultures, all suc-
cessful counterinsurgency campaigns are based 
on common principles” (Cohen et al., 2006: 49). 
Our goal is to build a basic counterinsurgency 
model which could enable deliberation, analysis 
and conduct. This would be a model which would 
be “neither a standard pattern nor a universal 
solution”, but rather a framework around which 
one could initiate a discussion and build plans. 
So, to refine our observations and combine them 
with personal empirical knowledge, we hold that 
the basic counterinsurgency operation model is 
composed of the following basic principles: in-
tervention preparation; defining centers of gravity 
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connected to the area of operations; the applica-
tion of political, military-police and social-econom-
ic mechanisms towards the centers of gravity; 
constant adaptation appropriate to challenges 
and the changes which affect the development 
of events and ensure conditions for a successful 
exit strategy.
3. The Preparation for Intervention
RAND expert Seth G. Jones has analyzed 
all insurgent uprisings from 1945 on (90 in total) 
and has discovered that successful counterin-
surgency operations have approximately lasted 
for 14 years while the unsuccessful ones have 
had an average of 11 years, while many con-
flicts have terminated without any victor (Jones, 
2008). This conclusion points to the fact that an 
intervening force on entering the conflict must 
expect a long, expensive and unpredictable war. 
For an intervening power to be ready to acti-
vate the necessary resources, it is imperative 
to keep developing a culture of readiness of all 
social components. Both the USSR and the US 
in Afghanistan have most directly witnessed the 
fact that this process presents a rather imaginary 
and fluid area. At the period of intervention the 
USSR has had the largest conventional army in 
the world while the US is the greatest military 
power in the history of mankind, but instead of 
an easy and swift victory over an incomparably 
weaker opponent, both powers got stuck in the 
wilderness of Afghanistan.
Geopolitical discourse which has led the So-
viets in their assessment of the situation has been 
preset by the Brezhnev doctrine of obligatory as-
sistance to any socialist country where socialist 
revolution was in danger. The Politburo has been 
weighing the issues of intervention for a long time 
for reasons of possible international community 
judgment which has later taken place. The Soviet 
Union (including Russia’s experiences as well) 
has always based its counterinsurgency opera-
tions very strongly on the conventional use of 
armed forces (Zhukov, 2010). After the decision 
to intervene in Afghanistan, the leadership of the 
USSR has defined the Afghan mission in very 
much the same manner. Andrei Doohovskoy 
has described that the Soviet leadership has ex-
pected to conduct a short war, very much in the 
pattern of interventions in Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Doohovskoy, 2009). So 
much so, that in February 1980, two months after 
the beginning of the intervention and when the 
Soviets could have already had first hand insight 
into the situation, Dmitriy Ustinov, the minister 
of defense presented his belief that the Soviet 
army would stay in Afghanistan for another year 
or year and half (Lyakhovski, 2009). Doohovs-
koy stated further that “while the Soviet ‘Limited 
Contingent’ was clearly not ready for the mission 
in Afghanistan, it is an oversimplification to fault 
the Soviet security forces for the overall failures 
of Kremlin policies in Afghanistan” (Doohovskoy, 
2009:7). The Politburo has misjudged the social 
and political dynamics in the country and has held 
that the main threat was coming from foreign op-
ponents, insurgents hailing mostly from Iran and 
Pakistan. Instead, they very soon had to face fierce 
resistance of local insurgents (Doohovskoy, 2009; 
Lyakhovski, 2009). General Alexander Lyakhovski, 
a participant of the conflict in Afghanistan, stated 
that the purpose of the intervention was to replace 
the inefficient president of the country and not to 
suppress the insurgency. They have planned to 
stabilize the situation, occupy military installations 
and assist Afghan authorities while national secu-
rity forces would be engaged in fighting the insur-
gents (Lyakhovski, 1995, according to Grau, 1997). 
Lyakhovski also brought forward the recollections 
of the army general I. G. Pavlovski who laid all 
the blame for the intervention on the chairman 
of the KGB Yuri Andropov, who has been misin-
formed of the situation in Afghanistan; the minis-
ter of defense Dmitriy Ustinov whom Pavlovski 
considered a good minister of defense but a bad 
politician who has mistakenly assessed that the 
entry of the Soviet forces into Afghanistan would 
secure Soviet borders and improve Soviet rela-
tions with Iran and Pakistan. Ustinov has been 
under the illusion that the intervention would 
attract Iran to their side. He finally also blamed 
the secretary general of the Communist Party 
Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev whom he 
considered temporarily incapable of assessing 
the situation correctly and producing decisions, 
as well as of being under the overwhelming in-
fluence of the assassination of his friend Taraki 
(the president of Afghanistan Hafizulah Amin has 
organized the liquidation of his predecessor Nur 
Muhammad Taraki). Pavlovski held that the invi-
tations to the Politburo sessions with important 
Afghanistan agenda issues have not been ex-
tended to all those not in favor of intervention, 
including himself (Lyakhovski, 2009). The USSR 
has mustered intervention support from social-
ist countries but has in no way counted that 
the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan 
would get directly involved in the conflict by sup-
porting the enemies. In relation to the US, the 
Soviets have also made a wrong assessment. 
They have not expected any such stormy reac-
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tion because they considered the US to be pre-
occupied with the hostage crisis in Teheran to 
the extent of not paying attention to the events 
in Afghanistan. Within the US, after the initial 
shock there came a sobering and the awareness 
that the case could be an opportunity not to be 
missed – in the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski – 
to lure USSR into a “bear trap”. The only regional 
country with a partner orientation towards the 
USSR has been India which supplied the Sovi-
ets with significant intelligence data on Pakistani 
aid to the Afghan mujahidin. The specific level of 
cooperation was also established with the Balu-
chistan Separatist Movement that looked towards 
separating Baluchistan from the rest of Pakistan 
(Bradsher, 1999 and Mitrokhin, 2002, according 
to Evsikov, 2009: 51). All the stated elements 
witness to the mistaken supposition and poor 
intervention preparation. The Soviets have inter-
vened in support and for the purpose of uphold-
ing the communist system in the country where 
such a political concept could have hardly found 
any fertile ground. Zamir Khabulov, Soviet am-
bassador to Afghanistan at the period of the in-
tervention has very openly compared the Soviet 
and the present Allied goals by saying: “We have 
attempted to impose communism. You attempt 
to impose democracy”, and goes on by saying 
that “there isn’t any mistake committed by the 
Soviet Union which has not been repeated by 
the international community” (Afghanistan: How 
to avoid the Russian mistakes, 2010: 1).
The reasons for the American intervention are 
much closer in terms of time and more obvious. 
After the 9/11 mega-terrorist attack on New York 
and Washington, the US leadership has opted 
for an expedient response. They set in motion 
a global war on terrorism while transforming the 
notion of terrorism in the way which has enabled 
them to proclaim war to another state in a con-
ventional manner (Chandiramani et al., 2010) and 
open a search for the perpetrators of the attack. 
On 2 October 2001, the American leaders have 
presented the results of the investigation on the 
attack to the NATO North Atlantic Council while 
stating the conclusion that the terrorist network 
of Al-Qaeda is responsible for the attacks. Since 
Al-Qaeda has used Afghanistan as its base 
country, the US have required that the Taliban 
regime extradite Osama bin Laden and his col-
laborators which the Taliban leader Mullah Omar 
has refused on the pretext that he should first be 
presented evidence after which he would allow 
negotiations on the possibility of extradition. The 
United States have not accepted this explana-
tion. During this time all NATO member states 
have agreed upon an activation of the Article 
5 of the Washington Treaty, it being the central 
clause of the basic NATO charter providing for 
the principle that an attack on any member state 
is to be considered an attack on all members. On 
4 October NATO members also brought a whole 
number of measures that supported the Ameri-
can move against terrorism. The measures in-
cluded exchange and cooperation among intel-
ligence services, as well as general over-flight 
permissions and the access of American and 
other Allied units to all sea and air installations 
within the framework of the antiterrorist opera-
tion (NATO Transformed, 2004). Having activat-
ed the Article 5 not all of Alliance member states 
were ready to accept the seemingly inevitable 
field operation so that the Allied readiness for 
real military force contribution in the Afghanistan 
was put to test. The US have therefore along the 
lines of cooperation with its closest ally (UK) un-
dertaken a formation of an antiterrorist coalition 
only to embark upon the attack on Afghanistan 
on 7 October, only 25 days after the terrorist act. 
In the course of the days following 9/11, the US 
have been closing its strategic perimeter round 
Afghanistan by ensuring transport corridors and 
supply airports in the neighboring countries, by 
introducing specialist teams in the interior of the 
country which established connection with the 
members of the opposition Northern Alliance. The 
American intervention has however been rash and 
burdened with specific insurmountable disadvan-
tages. The intervention has begun with distinctly 
military goals and methods, with minimum force in 
the field and insufficient political framework. In ad-
dition to all this, numerous allies have not initially 
responded to the alliance’s call to arms in a man-
ner expected by the US and in the face of less 
than unconditional support, the US have moved 
out with the available forces. Also, the available 
US resources have been comparatively limited 
and have not been employed to a sufficient de-
gree. American civilian mechanisms designed for 
the sort of tasks have considerably thinned after 
the end of the Cold War because all other insti-
tutions except the Armed Forces have stopped 
keeping alive the culture of readiness. They have 
predominantly reacted only after the outbreak of 
the crisis. Furthermore, the major institutions of 
the American security architecture which were 
formed in a different period to meet different chal-
lenges, have also been too hierarchic versus a 
dispersed enemy with lateral networking and in-
creasing capability of individual synchronization 
of its actions. Bob Woodward has brought up an 
interesting fact that the US have well-developed 
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intervention war plans against many states that 
have been out of their favor. In the beginning 
of the 21st century the US have had 68 opera-
tional war plans (Woodward, 2004). Judging by 
the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, many 
of these plans should undergo revision. Specific 
recommendations for the intervention phase:
• Keep developing the readiness culture. 
• Apply lessons learned in previous coun-
terinsurgency operations. 
• Intervening force must enter the area of 
operation with the clear vision of goals and 
means to achieve them. It is necessary to 
establish also a clear political framework 
for the conduct of operations. 
• Ensure the widest possible international 
support for the intervention. 
• Establish cooperation with the neighbor-
ing and regional countries. 
• All the intervention force elements should 
be very familiar with the country of inter-
vention situation, culture, customs, tradi-
tion, features and differences. 
• Regardless of the size and the power, the 
unity of effort and the employed resourc-
es is of exceptional importance because 
in spite of the potential, no country has 
got limitless resources at its disposal. 
• The intervening force must take into ac-
count the multidimensional state of the af-
fairs and the players in the field, be familiar 
with all the subjects in the space and their 
roles and maintain as many as possible 
number of contacts and coordination with 
the interested subjects/parties in the area 
of operation (media, various humanitarian 
and development agencies).
• It is essential to inform national general 
public of the goals and processes in the 
field as well as to ensure the national pub-
lic support for the national forces.
• Be prepared for the casualties and long 
and costly intervention (Mikac and Buntak, 
2011).
4. Centers of Gravity
In his classic On War Carl von Clausewitz de-
scribed a center of gravity as an object of aspira-
tion (e.g. persons, places, objects or capacity) 
of opposing sides. It is necessary to recognize 
and understand them as manifold subjects for 
the sake of one’s own action towards them. Cen-
ters of gravity are sets of knots towards which 
all power, energy and directions of action are 
directed and whose overpowering is directly re-
lated to everything else (Santos, 2011). NATO’s 
Glossary of Terms and Definition defines centers 
of gravity as following: “Characteristics, capabili-
ties or localities from which a nation, an alliance, 
a military force or other grouping derives its free-
dom of action, physical strength or will to fight” 
(NATO, 2008:2-C-3). US Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms de-
fines centers of gravity as following: “The source 
of power that provides moral or physical strength, 
freedom of action, or will to act” (US Department 
of Defense Dictionary, 2010: 46). When the inter-
vening force arrives at a decision for intervention 
it is necessary to determine centers of gravity 
towards which the intervention will be directed. 
The basic model detects five centers of gravity, 
namely – local population, opponent, local gov-
ernment, Allied forces and resources, outside op-
ponent support. There are two basic approaches 
to the model in regard to the focus of operation: 
the population-centered and the enemy-centered 
paradigm. With the first approach, the popula-
tion is the primary target of the operation and 
the strategic center of gravity while all the other 
centers of gravity are of operational character. 
With the second approach, the destruction of the 
enemy is the strategic center of gravity while the 
exploitation of the operational centers serves the 
purpose of achieving the primary goal. It is im-
portant to note that there is no precise line of de-
marcation between the two approaches and that 
it is essential to establish a gravity of approach 
(Mikac and Buntak, 2011). The number of cen-
ters of gravity and approaches may depend on 
more than just time and space, but for the pur-
pose of this article these five will suffice.
At the very beginning of the intervention, the 
Soviets have selected the top level of the Peo-
ples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) as 
their strategic center of intervention. They elimi-
nated President Hafizulah Amin and put Babrak 
Karmal in his place. Then they went to stabilize 
the party which was divided by the faction con-
flicts. This proved to be quite a difficult task be-
cause to many participants the conflicts within 
the party had more importance than fighting 
the common enemy (Robinson, 2010). This at-
titude has continued for years. The interparty 
conflicts have also influenced the Afghanistan 
armed forces that have also become an area 
for factions conflict (Bogdanov, 2005). With the 
outbreak of more serious engagements and with 
the increasing number of Soviet Army casualties, 
the Soviets transferred their focus on insurgents, 
making them strategic center of gravity while 
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they continued to instruct the top level of PDPA 
who then got the status of operational center of 
gravity, together with national security forces. After 
several years of misuse of the operational focus 
on destruction, the Soviets realized that military 
measures would not amount to any significant 
outcome and went on to repeatedly change the 
strategic center of gravity and turn towards the 
top of the government. Mikhail Gorbachev became 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
USSR in 1985. Although he has not been in favor 
of the Afghan War he has nevertheless allowed 
the supporters of war methods some more time 
to try and find the right road to victory. After a 
year, having realized the fact of a status quo in 
the Afghan area of operation, he arrived at a 
decision to terminate the operation. In the very 
same year the Soviets changed Karmal for Na-
jibullah and started seeking a political solution. 
Therefore the negotiations to end the war were 
given advantage (Robinson, 2010). Within three 
years, the Soviets have changed their strategic 
center of gravity three times while their central 
approach has primarily had the same enemy-
centered orientation.
The present situation with the Americans in 
the Afghanistan is somewhat more complex. 
They are the leading nation in two parallel op-
erations with simultaneous, yet different strate-
gic centers of gravity. Operation Enduring Free-
dom has had a counterterrorist orientation from 
the very beginning and the opponent has been 
the strategic center of gravity all the time. The 
basis of this operation is the enemy-centered 
approach which has special priority of conduct 
all the time. At the same time, they have opened 
the Operation ISAF in a much more reluctant 
manner, leaving it up to a certain point to Eu-
ropean allies. In ISAF and around ISAF the es-
tablishment of national government has from the 
beginning been the goal with greatest allocated 
resources which has therefore had the primacy 
of strategic center. Despite of the recognized 
problems, the non-functioning of the political 
system and the ever stronger insurgent attacks, 
the Americans have kept supporting their political 
favorite Hamid Karzai, although they have shifted 
their strategic orientation to the conduct of the 
armed segment of operation. The Allied forces 
and their resources became the most important 
center (all the exterior elements and national se-
curity forces). They have set out to build national 
security forces by reforming the national security 
sector so as to make them capable of getting to 
grips with the majority of challenges. Though the 
stated approach has not produced results with-
in the allotted time it is nevertheless in power 
and equally so is the support to president Kar-
zai in spite of the loss of general Afghan sup-
port, the strategic center of gravity has moved 
once again on the local population. Also, in the 
recent years maximum effort has been invested 
into training of national security forces and tak-
ing over of the initiative from the opponent. No 
less, the American messages in regard to the 
need of finding political solution are getting ever 
louder which has been unthinkable only a year 
or two earlier. We could therefore state that the 
Americans have after the initial wondering and 
search finished tracking the adequate direction 
of operation within the ISAF and they have opted 
for the conduct of a counterinsurgency operation 
with population centric approach. The Ameri-
cans have therefore demonstrated the trend of 
changing the center of gravity with the simulta-
neous acceptance of existence of two or more 
strategic centers because of the conduct of two 
different operations. At the same time there is a 
considerable degree of similarity with the Soviet 
intervention in terms of selection and relation to 
the centers of gravity.
5. The Political Dimension of the Relation to 
Centers of Gravity
Once those centers of gravity are defined and 
the intervention itself is set in motion, it is neces-
sary to equally apply political, military-police and 
social-economic mechanisms on the centers of 
gravity. This step is the very heart of the model. 
Special emphasis has been put on the political 
aspect of the counterinsurgency operation since 
it determines other mechanisms.
The recommendations of the military-police 
and social-economic aspect/dimension in regard 
to the centers of gravity:
• In regard to military-police operations it is 
primarily necessary to protect the native 
population, ensure public safety and sep-
arate the insurgents from the population 
as much as possible. When the popula-
tion starts to feel secure and protected for 
a longer period of time it is going to be 
much easier to collect quality intelligence 
information on the insurgents from them. 
Since all the insurgents are of local ori-
gin and everybody knows everybody, the 
population is the most important medium 
for intelligence collection. 
• All the operations must be conducted ac-
cording to intelligence data.
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• The attempt should be made to defeat 
the enemy in the battlefield even though 
a decisive battle will almost never come 
to pass. It is important not to use force 
excessively because it is most frequently 
counterproductive, even when induced by 
enemy provocation from the insurgents. 
• The foreign forces will in the long term help 
the home government best if they follow 
their policy of conflict resolution, ensure all 
the requirements for quality training and 
supervising of national security forces and 
if they take over some functions and tasks 
for which national force may not have suf-
ficient capacity and/or knowledge/exper-
tise. 
• The Allied forces must have sincere and 
open relations while supporting one an-
other and engaging their resources on 
subsidiary principle.
• External aid to the insurgents must be 
limited to the lowest possible degree. If 
political actions fail to prevent the exterior 
aid it is necessary to prevent any deliv-
eries of aid to the insurgents and disrupt 
their assistance in the border areas by the 
use of joint military-police tactics and 
techniques. 
• The conduct of operational decentralization 
should be introduced into areas of military-
police mechanisms and the field command-
ers should be given resources, responsibil-
ity and authority to conduct them. 
• The local population should be given a chance 
of realistic and sustainable, improved living 
standard, should be given alternative choices, 
should have basic civilization requirements, 
should have real needs satisfied, should 
have improved infrastructure and local proj-
ects to participate in. They should not be 
made dependent on humanitarian assis-
tance. The youth should be offered inter-
national grants, the most needy should be 
internationally accepted for specific periods 
of time as well as all the wounded and the 
sick who should have foreign medical treat-
ment in all cases of more complex medical 
treatments which cannot be carried out in 
the country. 
• National government should be assisted 
in major infrastructure projects, their fiscal 
and budget sustainability ensured, as well 
as the support of all the social programs. 
The total amount of financial investment 
in this area should be increased consider-
ably (Mikac and Buntak, 2011).
The stated part has been given in a form of 
recommendations and a comparison of the man-
ner which the intervening forces have adopted. 
The recommendations have not been presented 
in the order of importance since they are all of 
equal significance. 
Clear, honest and open relations to the local 
population are exceptionally important. The lo-
cal population should constantly be informed of 
the goals, of the manner of conduct; one should 
bring to their attention that the intervening force 
is deployed to their country to assist them and 
their government in defeating the insurgents af-
ter which the intervening forces would withdraw. 
The primary principle of failure or success is the 
protection of the population. The satisfaction 
of their basic needs, separation from the insur-
gents and winning them for the cause are the key 
variables of success. One must never underesti-
mate the local population or the enemy. 
Kilcullen holds that “the majority of the Af-
ghans simply wants security, peace and pros-
perity and would take the side which is most 
likely to prevail and fulfill their expectations”. In 
view of this Kalev Sepp points out that the ma-
jor goal of the counterinsurgency forces is to get 
victory over the convictions of the local popula-
tion and ensure their support to the local govern-
ment (Kilcullen, 2009: 66; Sepp, 2005, accord-
ing to Doohovskoy, 2009: 55). The USSR and 
the US have both had specific intentions for their 
presence in this area, which have been more or 
less successful. To what degree is present-day 
Afghanistan not covered by the intervening forc-
es and their initiatives but also frozen in time in 
its rural areas, has been the experience of Seth 
Jones who has travelled throughout the country 
during the current intervention. He has discovered 
Afghanis who have never heard of Hamid Karzai, 
the president of Afghanistan and who also hold 
the Americans to be Soviets since they are igno-
rant of the fact that the Soviets have withdrawn 
in 1989 (Jones, 2009).
The Soviets soon discovered that the local 
population has been under a growing influence 
of Islamist factions and have invested a lot of 
effort to win them over to their side i.e. to the 
side of the Afghan government. The Soviets em-
barked upon a considerable number of social 
programs in the field of education and culture 
in towns where the ruling nomenclature enjoyed 
a greater degree of popular support (Doohovs-
koy, 2009) while in rural areas with the support 
of the Afghan army they opened a number of 
infrastructural projects which covered house re-
pairs, road and irrigation channels construction 
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(Bogdanov, 2005). The cooperation was estab-
lished through sponsorships of Afghan areas by 
neighboring Soviet areas. The Soviet sponsors fi-
nanced all life necessities of neighboring Afghan 
area – from the purchase of basic food stuffs to 
building schools and constructing infrastructure. 
However, the problems with organization and co-
ordination in field activities appeared which result-
ed in the lack of expected success. This model 
was very expensive for the USSR and its para-
dox lies in the fact that insurgents in the Pakistan 
border areas managed to top the supply levels 
of both the Afghan government and the Soviets 
(Gromov, 1994). The events in the field were de-
scribed by field marshall Akhromeyev in the fol-
lowing way: “Kabul and the major provincial cen-
ters are under our control but everywhere else 
the regime has no authority. We have lost the 
battle for the people of Afghanistan. The military 
can maintain the existing situation continually but 
they cannot resolve it” (Ewans, 2005: 120).
The Americans today have at their disposal 
the knowledge and numerous instruments which 
they make good use of. The problem, however, 
lies in the fact that the opponents with better 
knowledge of the local customs, culture and lan-
guage make very good use of the capabilities 
of modern technology and beat the allies using 
“their own weapons” (Fisk, 2010; Santos, 2011). 
This is where we arrive at the point of individual 
views and understanding of the questions like 
the perception of reality, the range of expecta-
tions and the limits of progress. According to the 
field research conducted biannually by the Asia 
Foundation on the pattern of several thousand 
Afghans, at the beginning of the intervention a 
great number of Afghans have considered the 
country’s general direction good, the security 
situation satisfactory and life generally better in 
terms of economic situation than in the times of 
Taliban rule. But with the passage of years there 
has occurred a loss of Afghan confidence into the 
correct direction of the country’s development 
and international intervention (Asia Foundation 
Publications 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010).
The opponent should be studied continu-
ally, equally so the strong points of his cause to 
fight, his strength, final goals as well as ideol-
ogy which he uses. Propaganda activities and 
psychological operations are important factors in 
this area. Political mechanisms should be put to 
use to destroy insurgent actions, to maintain a 
constant initiative and pressure over it in order 
to try to curb their goals. It is rational to offer the 
opponents to open the peace process, reconcili-
ation and reintegration but these all have to be 
the processes led and owned by the national au-
thorities.
In both cases, however, the opponent has been 
drastically oversimplified, unified under a common 
political denominator and neglected in terms of 
goals of his struggle. The opponent has however 
in both cases been a complicated amalgam of 
various ethnic-religious components, not always 
sharing the same political goal, of transnational 
terrorist networks, of exterior ideological fighters, 
of organized criminal groups as well as of para-
military formations headed by the local war lords. 
All of them are most frequently qualified as insur-
gents. The fight against such a diverse structure 
of enemies cannot be won by military means – 
which both of the intervening forces have primar-
ily attempted – and should be achieved through 
an overwhelming approach where the political 
role is crucial, albeit with the indispensable fac-
tor of a functioning police and justice apparatus.
The Soviets have had major opponents in the 
mujahidin with the ideological-political goal of 
struggle against the pro-communist government 
in Kabul and the exterior enemy which support-
ed the regime. The Soviets were not able to sup-
press enemy activities by political means so that 
after the enemy unification they decided to open 
negotiations. They had no success in applying 
military measures so that they were forced to 
“liberate” certain areas several times. The unifica-
tion of mujahidin factions has taken place in mid-
1980s. Seven insurgent Sunni factions founded 
the Ittehad-i-Islami Afghan Mujahidin (Islamic 
Union of Afghani Mujahidin) in Peshawar in 
1985. Similarly, in 1987 under Iranian sponsor-
ship the foundation of Hizb-i Wahadat-i Islami 
(Islamic Unity Party), the association of eight in-
surgent Shia groups has taken place (Tabak, 
2001). The negotiation process was headed by 
president Najibullah but the insurgents did not 
accept it to any considerable degree (Gromov, 
1994; Robinson, 2010; Tabak, 2001).
The present opponents are Taliban, Al-Qae-
da, local military leaders, Hekmatyar’s mujahidin 
group Hizb-e Islami, various armed gangs and 
smugglers – a group more complex than the one 
once facing the Soviets. Although some of the 
factions wage war against each other, all of them 
have a common goal of expelling the Allies and 
the defeat of the Kabul regime. The opponents 
have strengthened their positions with time and 
have become significant security and political 
subjects. The perception of this enemy shows 
a too “Taliban-centered” approach, which then 
prevents any significant progress. The Afghan 
Taliban (main factions are the Quetta Shura Tali-
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ban – Kandahari faction; Haqqani and Mansur 
network and the Tora Bora Front) have specific 
links to Al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban and 
as confirmed by latest information, not only the 
political-ideological orientation but also the incli-
nation to use their infrastructure for profit which 
has then become primary to some of them. 
The challenge is so much greater because the 
analyses point to the existence of contacts and 
specific degree of cooperation among the insur-
gents (Taliban), terrorists (Al-Qaeda) and organized 
crime groups on one side and some government 
representatives (corruption). In a cross-section 
perspective, the situation is quite similar to the 
one encountered by the Soviets. President Kar-
zai has been among the first to launch an initia-
tive on the need for all-Afghan reconciliation as 
perhaps the only possible solution of terminating 
the war. He has repeated it some ten times. The 
Americans have refused to listen to the first pro-
posals of the sort but recent years have demon-
strated their gradually growing awareness that 
some kind of “reconciliation” cannot be avoided 
as the part of the solution of the exit strategy.
The national government leaders should be 
assisted in their actions, additional international 
aid should be ensured, donation conferences or-
ganized for their sake, they should be assisted in 
all critical areas and obligations of a long-term al-
liance given. Their correct political activity should 
be encouraged, assistance in reforms should be 
given, support in the conduct of free and inde-
pendent elections offered, legitimate election re-
sults should be acknowledged, while pointing to 
corruption problems and inefficient administra-
tion, as well as enabling the leadership to own 
key processes. It is necessary to assist the na-
tive government in behaving responsibly, in get-
ting ready to take over responsibilities and in be-
ing capable of convincing the native population 
to fight for the common cause to the best of its 
capabilities. 
Since the fundamental instrument of counter-
insurgency operation is a political solution – the 
establishment of a self-sustaining legitimate lo-
cal government is the goal of all goals (Bayley 
and Perito, 2010). It is, however, exceptionally 
difficult to transfer values of a different civiliza-
tion, ideological and organization cultures into a 
pre-modern society like the Afghan one, where 
the major part of social life revolves around the 
tribal community. Individual authors have report-
ed that Soviet leaders have created many suc-
cessful policies for Afghanistan which could not 
have been applied for several key reasons. One 
of them was the continual conflict in the ruling 
NDPA party which could not be stopped despite 
all the efforts. Fractions have had the primary 
support of Karmal personally through his placing 
of his supporters, the Parchamists, on all essen-
tial position in the administration. He refused to 
listen to his Soviet advisors and kept persecuting 
all dissenters while all the time trying to trans-
form Halqists into Parchamists. Such an ap-
proach further induced a rift within the party and 
led the Soviets to the decision on his deposition 
as early as late 1986. Also, many of these poli-
cies were poorly conducted, with insufficient co-
ordination between the military and the political 
effort and due to political reasons with the ever 
present lack of available resources. The military 
commanders often used to point out that there 
has hardly been a task which they have or could 
not have carried out but that military victories 
have unfortunately had no political support. The 
Soviets instructed the NDPA party leadership of 
the need to create a political base in as many 
social groups as possible. Kremlin strongly sug-
gested to the Afghan leadership that it was im-
perative to behave openly and friendly towards 
Islam, to include tribal and religious leaders into 
political dialogue, to improve life conditions in 
the rural areas, to discontinue the economic dis-
crimination of the Shia community and to gener-
ally increase the development of soft programs 
(Doohovskoy, 2009; Gromov, 1994; Robison, 
2010). Martin Kipping holds that the Soviets 
have, while cooperating with the Afghan govern-
ment, been successful in building a system and 
institutions in areas secured by security forces, 
most frequently in towns. The best illustration of 
the national system functioning was the survival 
of the local administration for several years after 
the Soviet withdrawal (Kipping, 2010). Almost all 
the authors point out that one of the key chal-
lenges and problems which undermined many 
projects was corruption of native members of the 
administration.
As of 2002 the US have engaged in estab-
lishing regional initiatives, bilateral strategic part-
nerships with Afghanistan and provincial recon-
struction teams in the security sector reform and 
in the process of building the Afghan political 
institutions, which was carried out first through 
parliamentary, then presidential and finally pro-
vincial elections. They have been strongly sup-
porting Hamid Kharzai from the beginning and 
still keep supporting him although an increas-
ing number of cracks damage this partnership. 
They predominantly played the card of a power-
ful central government in Kabul. But, president 
Karzai’s position suffers from loss of support 
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in the country, as well as abroad, his influence 
outside Kabul is constantly decreasing while the 
greatest error for his and his sponsors’ cause 
has been his 2010 statement when he twice re-
peated that should foreign pressures continue 
he himself would join the Taliban. The statement 
made by US ambassador to Afghanistan Carl 
W. Eikenberry (ambassador to Afghanistan from 
April 2009 to July 2011) very clearly illustrates 
all the complexity of the situation in the coun-
try. Ambassador Eikenberry has in the course of 
December 2009 twice written to the State De-
partment and as this US embassy official cor-
respondence has been leaked to the public it has 
become common knowledge that the ambassador 
thinks that the US overestimate the capabilities of 
the Afghan security forces while they underesti-
mate the time required to build civil institutions. 
Karzai was qualified as an inadequate strategic 
partner while there is an almost total lack of an 
Allied civil-political framework for Afghanistan 
(Eikenberry, 2009). The insider Peter W. Gal-
braith offered dark forecasts regarding the ef-
ficiency of US policies towards Afghanistan, as 
well as the future of the country. He has stated 
that Karzai is the leader of the country which is 
the second most corrupt country in the world ac-
cording to Transparency International. He stated 
that many Afghans consider the country’s gov-
ernment to be an institution engaged in plunder-
ing in cooperation with numerous local power 
players. He also warned that the Karzai fam-
ily has been observed in many activities which 
have damaged the country’s security, as well as 
its development prospects. In regard to the US 
counterinsurgency strategy he thinks that since 
it relies on the support of a reliable and efficient 
local partner while being in cooperation “with the 
corrupt, ineffective, erratic, and illegitimate Kar-
zai government in power, the US counterinsur-
gency strategy simply cannot work. Karzai has 
not yet lost Obama, but he is in danger of losing 
his country” (Galbraith, 2011: 12).
In regard to the cooperation with the Allied 
forces, the leading intervention power must es-
tablish political coordination at the highest level 
and ensure engagement of additional resources 
without hidden intentions of any of the partici-
pants. The consensus is necessary also in the 
area of building critical systems of the country 
of intervention so that local allies would in time 
become capable of taking care of the challenges 
that are being generated within their environ-
ment. It is necessary to provide a sufficient num-
ber of civilian expert advisers for long-term as-
sistance to the local government.
Jones thinks that the possibility of the na-
tional security force to defeat the insurgents and 
establish the rule of law is the key to the suc-
cess of any counterinsurgency operation (Jones, 
2009). Although the Soviet contingent during the 
intervention reached the figure of 130 thousand 
soldiers for the reasons of a mistaken approach, 
the engagement of inadequate units, as well as 
slow adaptation, their strategic advantage was 
operationally not exploited. As an external force 
they predominantly operated in the field unilater-
ally and had no coordination and communication 
problems with the external elements of the oper-
ation of the interface nature that the Allied forces 
experience today. But, they had problems within 
their own operational entity. Kipping is in pos-
session of data that the Warsaw Pact countries 
have participated in the intervention with a lim-
ited number of civilian experts and political advi-
sors and have trained Afghans in their respective 
countries. (Kipping, 2010). General Makhmut A. 
Gareev held that “[t]he Soviet political and mili-
tary leadership from the very start, in truth right 
up to the very end, had no definite political, stra-
tegic plan and single conception of how to use 
military forces in Afghanistan. There was no 
responsible person to whom all the institutions 
carrying out various tasks were subordinate” 
(Robinson, 2010: 21). In the area of cooperation 
with the national security forces, Soviet military 
and the civilian advisors have had a primary fo-
cus on the strengthening of the Afghan armed 
forces which has in general Vladimir Bogdanov’s 
description been qualified as the building of to-
tally new Afghan armed forces. He has noted the 
success in abolishing party conflicts which also 
spilled over to the army from the NDPA party 
(Bogdanov, 2005). It is also of interest to note 
that general Lyakhovski is rather critical of the 
armed forces reconstruction and states that little 
was done in the area (Lyakhovski, 2009). Dur-
ing this period much less effort was put in the 
reconstruction and rebuilding of the police force 
while the establishment of the local self-protection 
groups was supported (Bayley and Perito, 2010). 
The establishment of the Afghan security system 
was done in a number of phases (Ewans, 2005) 
and had a lot in common with the present situ-
ation. The relatively most efficient segment was 
that of the secret service KHAD (Kipping, 2010) 
which wa established and operated by the Soviet 
KGB. The paradox of building the security sec-
tor in Afghanistan (which is the same model that 
the Allies face today) lies in the fact that various 
faction figures, Karmal and Najibulah included, 
obstructed Soviet attempts of strengthening the 
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Afghan army (Lyakhovski, 2009; Kipping, 2010). 
Metz has offered a simple explanation for this. 
For many weak and unstable regimes the insur-
gents are less dangerous than an organized and 
efficient security forces. For, many more regimes 
have been toppled in military coups than by the 
insurgents (Metz, 2007). The collapse of the Af-
ghan security architecture and regime began 
with the discontinuation of Soviet aid and sup-
plies. So that looking at the Soviet effort from this 
point of view, we could say that they have been 
comparatively successful in building the Afghan 
security forces but that the forces in question 
have not been able to defend the regime against 
the insurgents.
On the other side, the US has stepped in with 
minimal force while relying on technological su-
periority, the alliance with local para-formations 
and a quick achievement of primary goals. The 
Allied situation in regard to the operational en-
gagement of human resources is a constant point 
of contention among Euro-Atlantic allies on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Partners outside the NATO 
contribute as much as they can. The main Wash-
ington reproaches go to major European NATO 
countries (not the UK) because of insufficient 
engagement in the field, insufficient number of 
the deployed soldiers, national mission caveats, 
presence only in the responsibility sectors, etc. 
But, they themselves have not deployed any im-
pressive numbers since the opening of the Iraq 
front has made Afghanistan a forgotten battle-
field with few deployable forces being sent there 
and for which reason they have pressured NATO 
to assume a more active role. There is, however, 
a deep strategic paradox in regard to the NATO 
engagement. The challenges and the problems 
arise from the fact, as elaborated by Sean Kay 
and Sahar Khan, that “NATO’s strategic value 
is undermined by its own institutional rules and 
procedures. Moreover, while NATO has adapted 
considerably to the post-Cold War environment, 
it has not focused serious attention on tactical 
assets needed for counterinsurgency… NATO 
has no historical experience of or capacity for 
directly engaging such movements, although by 
summer 2006 it had been placed at the center 
of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan” 
(Kay and Khan, 2007: 163).
In fact, just with the change of the White 
House administration in 2009 Afghanistan has 
once again become of American primary inter-
est for which reason it has been given complete 
attention and greater resources. The educa-
tion and training of the national security forces 
have always been among the key Allied goals in 
Afghanistan and in the recent years they have 
been made a strategic center of gravity. For 
the reason of this approach the national security 
forces have experienced an “explosion” of train-
ing, education and engagement and have begun 
taking over responsibility for the provincial order 
and security from the Allied forces by the first 
half of 2011. The handing over of responsibility 
would have to be completed by the year 2014. 
The police have been given much less attention 
and resources than the armed forces within the 
framework of the security sector reform. Bayley 
and Perito hold this to be one of the key Allied 
failures. For, the police force is an ever present 
face of the national government and the only 
mechanism among the security sector institutions 
capable of winning over the native population to 
the effort and for goals common to the members 
of national institutions and the international com-
munity (Bayley and Perito, 2010). The Americans 
have attempted, like the Soviets before them, for 
reason of public security, to establish legitimate 
para-police forces from tribal militias. Through-
out the operation the trend of great reliance on 
private security companies has given ground for 
concerns.
What has been identical in both the cases, have 
been the field operation military commanders’ re-
quests to the national political elites to increase 
the respective force numbers and resources in or-
der to fulfill the tasks when resources have been 
curbed. Equally so common to both the cases has 
been the lack of perception on the importance 
of political, social and economic component of 
the Afghan security, with the insufficient and 
discontinued coordination and investment into 
non-military projects which has been too small 
in comparison to the extent of the military effort.
All the studies of the insurgency show that 
the crucial element of their development and 
efficiency is the external support. It is essential 
that all political means are exploited to make the 
countries supporting the insurgency discontinue 
their assistance.
The Soviet leaders have at once realized 
the importance of Pakistan for the Afghanistan 
internal process and have issued specific direc-
tions to the Kabul regime to open transparent 
talks with the official Islamabad in order to limit 
their participation in the conflict and normalize 
the situation with the Afghan refugees in Paki-
stan (Doohovskoy, 2009). The situation has de-
veloped differently. Pakistan has become the 
source of everything what the Soviet opponents 
have only wished for. The location of safe ha-
ven, a place to regroup, recruit new members, 
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for training and education, planning and also for 
financial and logistic support. The situation with 
Iran has only been little better. Many in fact agree 
that Pakistan has been one of the major causes 
of the Soviet failure in Afghanistan. The Soviets 
could have done very little because the US has 
very strongly backed Pakistan. When political 
means produced no result, USSR has decided 
to engage in limited secret special force opera-
tions on Pakistani territory and also to intensify 
effort of closing as much as possible of the Af-
ghan-Pakistani border (Gromov, 1994). The at-
tempt to close down the border of 2430 km in 
length which is inaccessible in many places has 
turned out to be impossible.
Soon after the beginning of the Allied attack 
on Afghanistan in 2001 when the Taliban were 
toppled from power and Al-Qaeda expelled from 
the country, the majority of the Taliban and al-
most the whole of the Al-Qaeda command struc-
ture have found refuge in Pakistan which then 
exposed Pakistan to serious challenges. The ini-
tial operation implications have been numerous 
and have to a greater degree determined the fur-
ther continuation of the conflict. The years have 
gone, public security in Afghanistan has not been 
achieved, the border has not been under control 
and Taliban and Al-Qaeda have relatively eas-
ily kept coming from their Pakistan hideouts and 
have kept entering Afghanistan to attack the Al-
lies. Numerous top-level American figures have 
pointed out many times to the insufficient en-
gagement of the Pakistan security forces against 
international and “Pakistani” terrorists, extremists 
and insurgents, as well as that the high-ranking 
Taliban have had freedom of movement and 
activity in big cities of Quetta and Peshawar, in-
cluding even their councils (Shuras). Regard-
less of how many times have these examples 
been brought up, one of the major reasons for 
the American leniency towards Pakistan is to be 
found in the fact that more than 80 percent of the 
total Allied logistics in Afghanistan relies on the 
incoming Pakistani land lines of communication. 
The Pakistani top state level is not capable of a 
nearly complete control of all the armed forces 
elements, the armed forces cannot control the 
activities of the ISI military secret service (Inter 
Service Intelligence), which in the final resort is 
not capable of managing various militant groups 
that have been created mainly for anti-Indian ac-
tivity. The US cannot have prevalent influence 
on Pakistan as long as the Pakistani strategy 
has kept its basic India-centric orientation. This 
approach is the reason for limited results in the 
counterterrorist and counterinsurgency fight. For 
fear of India, Pakistan does not want to restruc-
ture its armed forces from conventional to more 
modern counterinsurgency units that would have 
considerable prospect of a more efficient sup-
pression against the opponents on its own ter-
ritory and in which way they would considerably 
assist the Allied effort (Mikac, 2011).
6. Adaptation
A counterinsurgency operation is a struggle 
of ideas (Counterinsurgency, 2006; McChrystal, 
2009) and requires innovative thinking and a 
constant verification of approach (Grau, 1997). 
The USSR and US have rushed into Afghanistan 
without any serious caution and have attempted 
to achieve victory through a predominantly mili-
tary approach but have soon come to realize 
that they lack quite a number of mechanisms for 
which reason they have begun ad hoc develop-
ment of counterinsurgency model of operations. 
The additional problem was caused by the fact 
that no matter how hard tried they could not 
escape the military matrix. Robinson arrived at 
fascinating data to support this thesis. The same 
percentages of resources have been allocated 
for military and non-military goals and the same 
had counted for ratio of military resources allo-
cated to humanitarian activities. The Soviet Army 
absorbed 94 percent of the total Soviet expen-
ditures (investments) in Afghanistan, in the very 
same manner of the US Ministry of Defense to-
day. Even the ratio of soldiers reassigned to the 
projects of “winning hearts and minds” of the lo-
cal population is approximately the same (Rob-
inson, 2010).
The Soviet adaptation included initiatives in 
three key areas: political, economic and military. 
The political and the military leaders “have devel-
oped counterinsurgency strategy which has cov-
ered all the three categories, including initiatives 
to win the Afghan people support through political 
means” (Doohovskoy, 2009: 32). The strength-
ening of the stability of the Kabul regime, as well 
as increasing its respect and influence has been 
a constant Soviet effort. In all the safer areas of 
the country they invested into the country’s eco-
nomic modernization (increased industrialization 
and the exploitation of the natural resources), 
with the consequence of opening new jobs (Kip-
ping, 2010). Najibullah and the Soviet advisors 
have jointly developed a policy of national recon-
ciliation which covered a wide range of actions 
and a declaration that the government had no 
further intention of continuing with the building 
of socialism but that it has got every intention to 
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rule in accordance with the Islamic tenets (Evsik-
ov, 2009; Ewans, 2005; Gromov, 1994). Gromov 
termed this period the stage of national-demo-
cratic revolution which has included: a temporary 
termination of armed conflict, the people’s right 
to the democratic organization of local adminis-
tration, the attempts to solve the refugee prob-
lem (the number of whom amounted to some 
4,5 million predominantly in Pakistan and Iran), 
the sending of advisors into rural areas for the 
purpose of improving life conditions, the signing 
of the cooperation agreements between the gov-
ernment and opposition leaders, the actions of 
bribing village mullahs and tribal leaders. In spite 
of all the efforts, the politics of national reconcili-
ation has not been adequately developed and 
neither has the passive NDPA managed to get 
sufficiently active to carry out the tasks. Also, the 
insurgents have perceived the government poli-
cy as a sign of weakness on the part of the state 
leadership and have intensified their actions with 
the final goal of creating the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan. The policy of national reconciliation 
was planned as a “special form of political com-
promise where three specific tasks of introduc-
ing the democratic order, of ending the war and 
of fast social-economic development, on the ba-
sis of the term used in Afghanistan at the time, of 
political multiparty system” (Gromov, 1994: 294). 
The analyses of the military area demonstrate that 
the Soviets have not been able to transform their 
armed forces completely, their primary instrument 
of the overall effort and to move from centralized 
and conventional approach towards a more dy-
namic and more efficient system (Doohovskoy, 
2009) leaving the one which clearly belonged to 
the past. Jones thinks that in spite of everything 
the Soviets have had an essentially incorrect un-
derstanding of the nature of counterinsurgency 
warfare (Jones, 2008).
The US often emphasize that Afghanistan is 
not only an American war but since many of the 
Allies turn a deaf ear to this sort of messages, the 
US are justified in raising the issue of their loyal-
ty and of their support in the coming period. Hav-
ing lost many years and having led two parallel 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, they have learned 
that the change of approach has become neces-
sary for fear of losing both of them. By evaluating 
the field situation, by taking into account the dy-
namics of challenge and on the basis of national 
and foreign counterinsurgency experience of the 
major powers, in 2006 they have published the 
Army and the Marine Corps handbook FM 3-24 
(MCWP 3-33.5) under the title Counterinsurgen-
cy. The introduction of the manual states that 
when conventional forces face the insurgents 
and try to defeat them by using only the conven-
tional means, they rarely succeed. The manual 
goes on to state that the majority of insurgen-
cies require a political solution. It is pointed out 
that the side to the conflict which is capable of 
faster learning and of adapting to the field condi-
tions usually wins. The whole of the handbook is 
population-centered with a dominant view of the 
positive attitude to the population of the country 
of operation. It has been pointed out that victory 
will be achieved when the local population ac-
cepts the legitimacy of its country’s government 
and stops active support of the insurgents. For 
this reason, the primary task of a counterinsur-
gency operation is to speed up the development 
of the legitimate government and its efficient man-
agement (Counterinsurgency, 2006). But the ex-
ecution has not been as planned. The constant 
problems have been: inadequate quantity of re-
sources engaged, insufficient coordination and 
lack of political will for any kind of decisive action. 
Further, many have qualified the present results 
as unsuccessful. Richard Holbrooke has very 
harshly stated that “the present American policy 
in Afghanistan is a failure” (Holbrooke, 2008: 
7). The adaptation has taken better course, as 
we have stated, with the change of the White 
House administration and deployment of addi-
tional forces to the field. One of them has been 
General McChrystal. McChrystal has started his 
mission with a document titled COMISAF’S Ini-
tial Assessment. This document offers a very 
good and deep analysis of the situation in the 
battlefield while not choosing any fine phrases to 
describe the limits and the results of his forerun-
ners and Allies; it has requested a real conduct 
of counterinsurgency strategy and taking over of 
initiative from the opponent. The Afghans have 
accepted him well because he has insisted on 
a population-centered approach and the primary 
protection of the population. He has also advo-
cated a change in the way of thinking and acting 
and has recognized as critical the weak point of 
relations between the central government and 
the local communities, especially so in the ru-
ral areas of the country; he has requested the 
strengthening of the local forces so that they 
would be capable of accepting future challenges 
(McChrystal, 2009). His request for an additional 
40 thousand troops in order to be able to carry 
out the planned tasks has created a huge bur-
den for President Obama who has been skepti-
cal in respect of the new increase in the number 
of soldiers for Afghanistan. Obama has been 
stretched between military advisors who have 
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suggested literal conduct of the counterinsur-
gency doctrine and a raised number of soldiers, 
as well as civilian advisers who have proposed 
a different approach. Eikenberry has expressed 
concern towards the counterinsurgency strategy 
which he has not considered to be the only and 
the most efficient method to achieve goals be-
cause it has been set too narrowly. He did not 
support the requests of the colleagues from the 
Ministry of Defense on engagement of several 
new thousands of soldiers since he has held that 
the key to success did not lie with the expanded 
military presence (Eikenberry, 2009). A similar 
position was shared by Holbrooke whom Obama 
nominated special presidential representative for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Holbrooke had doubts 
about “the right road” of war in Afghanistan and 
considered military victory to be out of reach and 
the reconciliation the key to the success.
7. Exit Strategy
The decision on the termination of the opera-
tion is brought by politicians in the same man-
ner as of the conduct of counterinsurgency op-
eration. Because of the duration of the operation 
compared to a much shorter time in cabinets, 
what happens most frequently is that one group 
sets the operation in motion while the other 
group takes over its place when the operation 
has to be brought to its close.
The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghani-
stan has been discussed for the first time as early 
as several months after the beginning of the in-
tervention. As the time passed, the Soviets have 
come to realize how damaging the intervention 
has been for their international reputation but 
were able to formulate an efficient exit strategy. 
Their concern has been that withdrawal without 
the goals achieved would make them losers in 
the eyes of the international community and the 
intervention would be called the Soviet Vietnam. 
Besides, they had concerns about the security 
of their own borders because of the insurgent Is-
lamist threats and since the second task of the 
intervention, stabilization of the Afghanistan situ-
ation, has not been reached. They have there-
fore decided to withdraw once the situation in Af-
ghanistan gets stable. After several rotations at 
the Soviet top, the head position was assumed 
by Mikhail Gorbachev who after a year-long con-
sideration decided to end the then six-year con-
flict and lead his forces out of it. This approach 
has not been to Karmal’s liking because he got 
used to all forms of Soviet aid, from military to 
economic. He has hoped that the Soviets would 
stay in Afghanistan “long if not forever” and did 
agree to the option of withdrawal. This view cost 
him his position. His successor Najibullah con-
cluded that the change in the NDPA politics was 
imperative and participated in the creation of 
politics of national reconciliation and agreed to 
negotiations which have resulted in the Soviet 
withdrawal (Ewans, 2005; Gromov, 1994). Under 
the auspices of the UN on 14 April 1988 the con-
ference on the termination of war in Afghanistan 
was held in Geneva. The representatives of the 
UN, the US, the USSR, Afghanistan and Paki-
stan took part in the conference. The termination 
of the conflict and the withdrawal of the Soviet 
forces were agreed in the following nine months 
and the use of the same route which they have 
used to come in. The withdrawal began on 15 
May 1988 and ended on 15 February 1989. With 
the termination of the Soviet-Afghan war the 
civil war which has grown into the “total conflict” 
between the NDPA government and mujahidin 
as well as interethnic conflict of the well-armed 
ethnic factions who have fought for the control 
of territory and the control of roads, has been 
continued. The Geneva agreement “expelled” 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan but the war was 
not stopped, the form of government in the coun-
try was not agreed upon nor was there agreed a 
termination of aid to the warring sides in Afghani-
stan. US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on one side 
and Iran on the other have continued to aid the 
mujahidin, while the USSR kept supporting the 
government in Kabul.
The American exit strategy, together with 
the exit strategies of many other players, have 
been set by president Obama. His position on 
the American wars was known even before his 
entering the White House. When as president of 
the US he got his chance, he decided to termi-
nate the wars. Iraq took him only a shorter period 
of time to conclude which then allowed him to 
concentrate on Afghanistan. At the end of 2009 
he published a Survey of State of Strategies for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Way Forward in Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan). The most significant 
elements from the Survey put emphasis on the 
position that Afghanistan is not lost but that rath-
er the Taliban have full swing in their operations. 
Such status quo is not sustainable and accepta-
ble while Al-Qaeda is repeatedly qualified as the 
greatest threat to regional and global security. He 
underlined three major areas of strategy: military 
effort towards transition, significant increase in 
civilian component and effective partnership with 
Pakistan. But, he announced that the withdrawal 
of combat units from Afghanistan is to begin in 
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the summer of 2011. He refused to go any further 
over several years of deployment in Afghanistan 
while focusing on the goals which are beyond 
capabilities and reach and which would be too 
expensive to satisfy US national interests in Af-
ghanistan. He is however determined in regard 
of the continuation of aid to Afghan institutions 
after withdrawal but has sent a message that the 
destiny of Afghanistan falls within the respon-
sibility of the Afghan government and primarily 
of the Afghan people themselves (Remarks by 
the President…, 2009). The results of the NATO 
Lisbon Summit can clearly be considered a suc-
cess for American politics of 2010. Except for the 
New NATO Strategic Concept for 21st Century, 
great attention has been given to Afghanistan. A 
long-term partnership agreement has been signed 
with Afghanistan, several standard pillars of rela-
tion to the country and the people emphasized: 
the Afghan leadership and the Afghan property, 
counterterrorist struggle and the comprehensive 
approach. The position on the support to all-Af-
ghan reconciliation and reintegration has been 
repeated. The training of Afghan security forces 
has been given sufficient space. The most sig-
nificant detail could easily be the agreement on 
handing over Allied control and supervision over 
the provinces to Afghan security forces which 
will have been completed by 2014. The Allies 
have taken responsibility to assist beyond that 
date. It is significant that this has produced a 
unity on Alliance level which would for some time 
silence the requests for individual exit strategies 
from Afghanistan. The majority of the countries 
would therefore withdraw in accordance with the 
American schedule.
8. Conclusion
The US-led Allies, very much like the USSR 
some 30 years ago, have at present intervened 
in Afghanistan rashly, without adequate prepa-
ration and without understanding the nature of 
Afghan politics, culture, faith and the mentality 
of the local population. The superpowers have 
committed mistakes which are identical in every 
phase of the operation. Although set in motion 
for completely different reasons, both interven-
tions have demonstrated success in achieving 
its initial goal of changing the top set of Afghan 
political sphere to their advantage in record time. 
But, already the next step has proven a failure 
for the powerful USSR as well as for the greatest 
global superpower, the US. Although they have 
gone to Afghanistan as technically and opera-
tionally superior to the “barefoot” opponents, a 
final success was achieved. Among other rea-
sons, for the external support to the insurgents, 
mainly from Pakistan, as well as for insufficient 
resources at all the levels, for the mistaken ap-
proach, though we find the main reason in the 
initial lack of counterinsurgency strategy and lat-
er, in its slow ad hoc formulation and adaptation 
to the situation.
Jones has very correctly observed two pre-
sent essential and interconnected challenges of 
the US in Afghanistan. The Soviets have been in 
the same situation in Afghanistan. First, the rural 
communities are the place where victory would 
be achieved or the defeat suffered in the counter-
insurgency operation and not in the urban centers 
(Jones, 2008). Second, “United States has craft-
ed its Afghanistan strategy on a fatally flawed 
assumption: The recipe for stability is building a 
strong central government capable of establish-
ing law and order in rural areas. This notion re-
flects a failure to grasp the local nature of Afghan 
politics” (Jones, 2009: 1).
The problem of the mistaken discourse lies 
in the fact that the superpowers have failed to 
observe that the support of the local population 
which predominantly lives in rural areas of Af-
ghanistan is crucial for the success of the inter-
vention. While the USSR has supported Babrak 
Karmal and has engaged in the faction struggle 
within the NDPA, the insurgents have won the 
majority of the Afghan population to their side. 
A similar situation has happened to the US in 
their support of Karzai and while building state 
institutions and national security forces, have 
judged the possibility of their independent influ-
ence on the population incorrectly for which rea-
son they have neglected the work with the local 
population. Both powers have been learning on 
the run and have been changing strategy from 
the enemy-centered to population-centered, with 
the population in the first line. In the case of the 
first intervention, with the passage of interven-
tion time, the Soviets have begun focusing on 
the population and with the key change coming 
when Karmal has been deposed and Najibul-
lah put in his place when the policy of national 
reconciliation was created. Although this policy 
has not come to be exceptionally successful, the 
Soviets were on the right track which then rais-
es the question on the final outcome had they 
stayed in the country and had their own state not 
collapsed. The key moment for the US has been 
the working out of a population-centered strat-
egy in the later years of the conflict whose final 
results are still to be seen.
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Unfortunately we are able to conclude that 
both superpowers did not learn much from their 
mistakes, as well as from the mistakes of their 
predecessors. Russia applied the same failing 
strategy in Chechnya in 1994. While comparing 
Afghanistan with Chechnya, Lyakhovski points 
out that the operation has again not been given 
adequate preparation time while the intervention 
itself was marked by an equal lack of clarity in 
terms of political and strategic goals, as well as 
uncoordinated institutional steps in assessing 
the character, significance and ways to resolve 
the conflict (Lyakhovski, 2009). On the other 
side, the US who has been supporting the Af-
ghan insurgents against the Soviets for almost 
a decade and has studied the Soviet strategy, 
at the time of its own intervention entered the 
conflict relatively unprepared and repeated So-
viet mistakes. The Americans, as well as the So-
viets before them, have taken too much time to 
realize that the winning of support of the local 
population should be the key of the success of 
the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
In conclusion, in this analysis we have primar-
ily determined the model of a counterinsurgency 
operation in general and have, through phases, 
compared the Soviet and the American approach 
toward the central elements of the model, the 
centers of gravity. The primary focus has been 
put on the analysis of the political dimension of 
a counterinsurgency operation because it deter-
mines all other mechanisms. We have estab-
lished, taking into account the full complexity of 
the situation in the field, that the intervening forc-
es have not sufficiently exploited their compara-
tive advantages over insurgents and have not 
timely recognized the necessity of having and 
applying a model of counterinsurgency opera-
tion and its development through stages. There-
fore we present the model proposed here as the 
frame upon which further considerations could 
be undertaken on the necessities of a continued 
Allied operation in Afghanistan.
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Politička dimenzija protupobunjeničke operacije: usporedba dviju 




Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb
Intervencija SSSR-a u Afganistanu od 1979. do 1989. godine i trenutačna save-
znička intervencija pod vodstvom SAD-a u istoj zemlji u mnogočemu se razliku-
ju, ali imaju i puno toga zajedničkog. Uzroci i krajnji ciljevi zbog kojih su zapo-
čete razlikuju se, kao i početni pristupi, no protokom vremena obje su prerasle 
u protupobunjeničke operacije. Obje su ušle u desetu godinu, iako su političke 
elite očekivale brze i kratkotrajne intervencije. Isto tako, u oba slučaja vojno su-
periorne, intervenirajuće snage ubrzo su postale operativno inferiorne, pri čemu 
su, zbog nerazumijevanja prilika, nedovoljne koordinacije, ali i slabog unutraš-
njeg saveznika, uz neadekvatan politički okvir, nedovoljno angažirane resurse 
i nepristupačan teren, osuđene tek na održavanje statusa quo. Zakazao je u 
prvom redu politički dio. Povlačenje je za Sovjete imalo razarajuće posljedice. 
Danas započeto povlačenje Amerikanaca, dok većina zadataka nije ispunjena, 
dvosjekli je mač, no dugotrajni vojni boravak na terenu nije rješenje. Važno je 
analizirati i usporediti ove dvije operacije kako bismo detektirati uspješno prove-
dene korake kao i propuštene prilike te izvukli zaključke za nastavak savezničke 
operacije jer – kako povjesničar Paul Robinson ispravno zapaža – saveznici se 
danas nalaze u sličnoj poziciji u kojoj su bili Sovjeti. Svrha je istraživanja dvo-
struka. Prva je analizirati bitna obilježja političke dimenzije protupobunjeničke 
operacije, ponajprije djelovanje intervenirajućih sila prema centrima gravitacije 
protupobunjeničke operacije, a druga dati preporuke za pravilnu primjenu načela 
protupobunjeničke operacije.
Ključne riječi: protupobunjenička operacija, SSSR, SAD, pobunjenici, lokalno 
stanovništvo, saveznici, centri gravitacije 
